Full textAbstract
In this study the authors show how market conditions influence referrals of patients by general practitioners (GPs). They set up a model of GP referral for the Norwegian health care system, where a GP receives capitation payment based on the number of patients in his practice, as well as fee-for-service reimbursements. A GP may accept new patients or close the practice to new patients. The authors model GPs as partially altruistic, and compete for patients. They show that a GP operating in a more competitive market refers more. To retain patients in his practice, a GP satisfies patients’ requests for referrals.
Furthermore, a GP who faces patient shortage will refer more often than a GP who has enough patients. More referrals may add to profits from future treatments. Using data of radiology referrals by GPs in Norway, they test and confirm the theory.
ISSN 1890-1735
ISBN 978-82-7756-208-7